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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2003, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, invited 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the 
Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) commission of serious international 
crimes.1  The referral followed almost two decades of conflict between the 
Ugandan army and LRA forces, several failed peace negotiations, and offers 
of domestic amnesty to the LRA rebels.2  Interestingly, Uganda’s “self-
referral”3 and the consequent threat to arrest, detain, and hand over the 
leaders of the LRA for trial at the ICC, appear to have produced a new 
willingness on the part of the rebels to negotiate peace.4  As a precursor to 
signing a comprehensive peace agreement, the LRA rebels agreed to submit 
to domestic accountability processes if the ICC warrants were dropped.5  In 
2007 and 2008, the Ugandan government and LRA rebels concluded two 
important agreements, which called for domestic accountability for the 
LRA’s crimes through the establishment of a national court to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of serious international crimes.6  Because these 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi. 
int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2004)” hyperlink; 
then follow by date).  
 2 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and 
Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, 10 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 405, 405–07 (2005); Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Note and Comment, 
The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for 
Northern Uganda, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 179, 183–84 (2006). 
 3 The notion of “self-referral” derives from Article 14 of the Rome Statute.  Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court art. 14, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute].  For a discussion of its history and significance in the context of the ICC’s work, see 
Payam Akhavan, Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the 
Villains or the Victims of Atrocities?, 21 CRIM. L.F. 103 (2010). 
 4 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Note and Comment, The ICC’s Possible Deferral of the LRA 
Case to Uganda, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 801, 802 (2008). 
 5 Id. at 804–05. 
 6 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, June 
29, 2007 [hereinafter Agreement], available at http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreem 
ents/Agreement_on_Accountability_And_Reconcilition.pdf; Annexure to the Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, Feb. 19, 2008 [hereinafter 
Annexure], available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Annexure_to_agreement_ 
on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf.  The Agreement was negotiated between the Government 
of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, under the mediation of General Riek Machar Teny-
Dhurgon, Vice President of the Government of South Sudan. It was witnessed by the 
Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania.  Agreement, 
supra. 
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agreements provided for domestic criminal prosecutions and traditional 
justice, questions have arisen about the continued admissibility of the LRA 
case before the ICC. This is due to the application of the principle of 
complementarity, under which the primary responsibility for investigating 
and prosecuting crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC falls to States, 
while the Court provides an alternative forum where national jurisdictions do 
not investigate or prosecute.7 
This Article discusses the impact of the domestic political and legal 
developments on the admissibility of the LRA case.  It challenges the 
suitability of a formal textual approach to determining admissibility and 
suggests that, given the delicate legal and political context of the Ugandan 
situation, it would be inappropriate to base the forum choice exclusively on 
the strict letter of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the 
Rome Statute).8 
Given the competing claims of advocates of “peace without justice” and 
“justice without peace,”9 this Article asserts that a strict retributive justice 
approach10 is unsuitable for the Ugandan situation.  The Article does not aim 
to rekindle the age-old debate that posits that peace and justice are polar 
opposites.  However, to set the stage for the ensuing discussion regarding the 
most appropriate forum to try the LRA leadership, this Article recognizes 
that it would be untenable to pursue justice in its Western, international 
incarnation, without regard for the wishes and aspirations of the people most 
directly affected by the Ugandan internal conflict. 
The views of the people of Uganda, especially victims from the Acholi 
community in the northern part of the country,11 regarding the various means 
by which those allegedly responsible for the most serious crimes in Northern 
Uganda could be held accountable, must be taken seriously.  For example, 
the argument that traditional accountability processes may be more suitable 
                                                                                                                   
 7 The preamble to the Rome Statute, supra note 3, notes the duty of every State to exercise 
its jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of international crimes, and that the ICC shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.  Article 1 of the Rome Statute also provides 
that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.  Id. art. 1. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and 
Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 804 
(2006). 
 10 Id. at 819.  In this context, the retributive justice claim is based on the argument that 
those who commit crime deserve punishment “as a moral imperative,” or alternatively, on the 
argument that the ICC has an institutional mandate to prosecute perpetrators of serious 
international crimes.  Id. 
 11 The Acholi community is the community most affected by the LRA.  See infra notes 
106–08, 115–17 and accompanying text.  
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for communal reconciliation and lasting peace should not be taken lightly or 
set aside.  After all, the best form of “justice” for a population that has been 
subjected to over two decades of brutal violence is peace—a peace that 
enables them to return to their homes, to resume farming for their food, to 
rear their animals, to bring up their children, and to make day-to-day choices 
in life as a dignified people.12  To insist on justice at the ICC, irrespective of 
how that might impact efforts to find a durable peace in Uganda, risks 
defeating the goals of both peace and justice.  Therefore, this Article 
suggests that a decision on the most appropriate forum for the LRA trial must 
not only be informed by the legal and moral imperatives to try Joseph Kony13 
and the other LRA leaders for the serious crimes for which they have been 
accused and the numerous victims in Northern Uganda, but also take into 
account how the forum choice might affect other goals, such as peace, victim 
participation in the justice process, deterrence, and legitimacy of the trial. 
This Article ultimately suggests a consequentialist approach14 to the 
question of forum choice.  It concludes that, in theory, Uganda-based trials 
offer the best prospect of attaining both peace and justice.  However, it also 
recognizes that this option will remain illusory unless Uganda overcomes its 
two decade-long inability to arrest the LRA leadership or to peacefully 
convince them to surrender.  In addition, if and when the LRA leadership is 
arrested or surrenders, and Uganda chooses to embark on a domestic 
accountability process, the country must do more to bring about genuine and 
credible prosecutions that meet international standards. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides background 
necessary to understand Uganda’s referral to the ICC; Part III discusses the 
law and jurisprudence on complementarity and admissibility under the Rome 
Statute; Part IV addresses the legal developments in Uganda that are relevant 
to a future domestic trial of the LRA leadership; Part V makes arguments in 
support of domestic prosecution of the LRA, given the equally important 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See Moses Chrispus Okello, Head, Research & Advocacy Dep’t, Refugee Law Project, 
Address at the International Conference on Peace and Justice: The False Polarisation of Peace 
and Justice in Uganda, at 4 (June 25–27, 2007), available at http://www.peace-justice-confere 
nce.info/download/WS-2-Expert%20Paper-Okello.pdf (arguing that “the greatest justice one 
can deliver to a people living in conflict is to enable them to enjoy some sort of peace and 
enable them to have a say in how they think justice should be done—and to whom”). 
 13 Joseph Kony is the alleged founder and leader (Chairman and Commander in Chief) of 
the LRA.  Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest, 
para. 7 (as amended Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF. 
 14 A consequentialist approach holds that “crimes of this magnitude must be punished in 
order to prevent their recurrence through deterrent, incapacitative, or norm-reinforcing effects 
of punishment.”  Blumenson, supra note 9, at 819. 
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goals of justice and peace; Part VI draws lessons from the referral 
jurisprudence of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) that could arguably guide Uganda’s national trials of the 
LRA; Part VII sets out procedural options available to Uganda under the 
Rome Statute and the ICC system of justice, if the country wishes to 
challenge the admissibility of the LRA case before the ICC; and Part VIII 
provides a few concluding remarks. 
II.  FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THE REFERRAL 
Uganda’s self-referral under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute 
invited the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to investigate serious 
international crimes allegedly committed by members of the LRA during the 
twenty years of internal armed conflict that commenced in 1986.15  In July 
2004, the ICC Prosecutor “determined that there [was] a reasonable basis to 
open an investigation into the situation concerning Northern Uganda,”16 and 
he applied to Pre-Trial Chamber II17 for arrest warrants against five top 
leaders of the LRA.18  The warrants, which were issued in July 2005 and 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Press Release, supra note 1; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 179–80.  The issue of whether the 
Rome Statue permits self-referrals remains a contested one.  Payam Akhavan suggests that, 
despite the complementarity principle, nothing in the Rome Statute or its negotiating history 
prohibits such referrals and notes that there may be domestic circumstances that justify turning 
to the ICC in exceptional situations.  Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: 
Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 403, 414 (2005).  On the other hand, Arsanjani and Reisman argue that during the 
Rome Treaty negotiations, no one envisaged the possibility that governments would want to 
invite the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes that occurred on their territory and that, 
therefore, no provision was made to cover this eventuality.  Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. 
Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
385, 386–87 (2005).  However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has endorsed the legality of self-
referrals by accepting them from three African countries—Uganda, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and the Central African Republic.  Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-
Referrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1268 (2010). 
 16 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens 
an Investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/M 
enus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2004)” hyperlink; then 
follow by date). 
 17 There are two chambers in the Pre-Trial Division of the ICC, each assigned to particular 
cases, that “play[ ] an important role in the first phase of judicial proceedings until the 
confirmation of charges upon which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial against the person 
charged.”  Pre-Trial Division, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of 
%20the%20court/chambers/pre%20trial%20division/pre%20trial%20division?lan=en-GB (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2011).  
 18 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA 
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made public three months later, charged Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya with multiple counts of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.19  These include murder, rape, 
pillage, enslavement, sexual slavery, cruel treatment, enlisting children in 
armed conflict, and attacks against the civilian population.20 
Uganda’s referral, however, did not prevent it from continuing to 
negotiate with the LRA for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.21  This was 
due to the view of a sizeable part of the victim population in Northern 
Uganda, including religious and traditional leaders and members of 
Parliament, that the ICC referral could give further impetus to the war and 
provoke reprisal attacks by the LRA against those perceived to support the 
government in Kampala, Uganda’s capital.22  In addition, the government’s 
peace initiative was a realistic acknowledgement of its inability to arrest 
Joseph Kony and the LRA leadership for nearly two decades.  Given the 
government’s inability to arrest the LRA or otherwise bring the conflict to an 
end, a comprehensive peace agreement that would encourage the voluntary 
surrender of LRA members was therefore deemed a reasonable or pragmatic  
option, especially when combined with processes for domestic 
accountability.23 
In 2007 and 2008, the Ugandan government and the LRA adopted two 
important agreements, which provided for national, instead of international, 
trials of war-related crimes.24  Following the conclusion of these agreements, 
several Ugandan government officials, including President Museveni, 
suggested that the LRA case would no longer be admissible at the ICC, that 
Kony would be tried in Uganda, and that the government could ask the ICC 
to withdraw the arrest warrants.25  However, as discussed in detail in the next 
                                                                                                                   
Commanders (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Med 
ia/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2005)” hyperlink; then follow by date).  
 19 Id.  
 20 Id.  Kony and Otti are each sought for 33 and 32 counts, respectively, of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity; Odhiambo faces 10 counts; Ongwen 7 counts; and Lukwiya 4 
counts.  Id.  On July 11, 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber terminated proceedings against Lukwiya 
after receiving confirmation of his death.  Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-
01/05-248, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska Lukwiya (July 11, 2007), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297945.PDF. 
 21 Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183–85. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 183–84. 
 24 See Agreement, supra note 6; Annexure, supra note 6.  
 25 Uganda: Interview with President Yoweri Museveni, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS 
(June 9, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54853.  President Museveni is 
quoted to have said, “If we told the ICC that we had found an internal solution, they would be 
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section, this argument was predicated, perhaps, on Uganda’s 
misunderstanding of the operation of the complementarity principle, under 
which the ICC is only empowered to investigate or prosecute international 
crimes within its jurisdiction if the relevant national system is not doing so. 
However, once the Court’s jurisdiction is triggered, States cannot prosecute 
the same case without an order from the ICC.26  
III.  COMPLEMENTARITY AND ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE 
Under the Rome Statute, the cornerstone of the relational architecture 
between the ICC and States Parties is the principle of complementarity set 
out in the Preamble and stipulated in Article 1.27  Unlike the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which enjoy primary jurisdiction to 
try serious international crimes enumerated in their respective statutes,28 the 
Rome Statute makes States Parties primarily responsible for trying 
perpetrators of crimes that fall within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.29  
According to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber, complementarity is “the 
cornerstone of the Statute,” and is the principle that reconciles “the States’ 
persisting duty to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes with the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court having competence 
over the same crimes.”30  Consequently, the ICC only possesses add on, last 
resort, or fall back jurisdiction, which is triggered where the admissibility 
criteria under the Statute are satisfied.  Complementarity operates as a 
                                                                                                                   
happy.”  Id.  The President is further reported to have stated that, if the LRA were to stop 
fighting and agree to a “blood settlement,” Uganda would not want the ICC to intervene further.  
Id.  As discussed below infra text accompanying notes 74–75, the ICC Judges have clearly found 
that the Rome Statute does not permit Uganda to withdraw its referral of the LRA case.  
 26 See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 27 Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.  The Preamble to the Rome Statute recognizes 
“the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes” and emphasizes that the ICC “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.”  Id. pmbl.  Article 1 establishes the ICC as a permanent body with 
“jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern . . . [which] 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”  Id. art. 1. 
 28 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 8, para. 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Updated Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 1877, art. 9, para. 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) (amending S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993)). 
 29 Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1. 
 30 Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the Admissibility of the 
Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, para. 34 (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccd 
ocs/doc/doc641259.pdf [hereinafter Kony Decision on Admissibility]. 
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mediating principle to resolve tensions arising from the interplay of domestic 
and international criminal jurisdictions under the Rome system of justice. 
The issue of admissibility under the ICC regime has been one of 
controversy and confusion.  Two predominant views stand out in the 
literature.  First, some scholars suggest that the principal criterion for 
determining whether a case is admissible before the ICC is whether the State 
is conducting domestic proceedings in the form of either an investigation or 
prosecution.31  Second, in what has now become known as the “slogan 
version” of complementarity, other scholars argue that a case is admissible 
before the ICC only if the primary jurisdiction state is “unwilling” or 
“unable” to conduct domestic proceedings.32 
Article 17, the governing provision, stipulates negative conditions, i.e., 
circumstances when a case will be inadmissible before the Court.33  It 
expressly recalls the principle of complementarity, and then lists four 
separate grounds of inadmissibility as follows: (a) the fact that a “case is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State . . . unless the State is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”; (b) a 
State has investigated a case and “decided not to prosecute . . . unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to 
prosecute”; (c) the person has been tried for the same conduct for which a 
complaint has been made to the ICC and a subsequent trial will violate the 
Statute’s ne bis in idem rule; and (d) “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity” 
to be tried by the ICC.34 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. L.F. 67, 
67 (2010); Danielle E. Goldstone, Comment, Embracing Impasse: Admissibility, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Lessons of Uganda for the International Criminal Court, 22 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 761, 785 (2008) (“[C]ontrary to the common articulations of 
admissibility, inability or unwillingness is not the test itself, but rather an exception to the 
default rule that a case under investigation by a state with jurisdiction is inadmissible.”); 
Akhavan, supra note 15, at 414 (“An ordinary interpretation of Articles 17(1)(a) and (b) 
indicates that unwillingness or inability is relevant only when a state has investigated or 
prosecuted a case; when it has not done so, there is no express requirement of establishing 
unwillingness or inability as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction.”). 
 32 Robinson, supra note 31, at 67–68; George H. Norris, Note, Closer to Justice: 
Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 201, 219 
(2010); Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 15, at 386–87; William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial 
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
731, 757 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he two prongs of the complementarity test are well known, 
even to non-specialists: the state must be ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to investigate or 
prosecute”). 
 33 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 1. 
 34 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. art. 20 (describing the ne bis in idem principle as a 
prohibition on being tried twice for the same offense). 
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Given the above wording of Article 17, the better view seems to be that a 
case is inadmissible before the ICC only when national proceedings, in the 
form of an investigation or prosecution, are taking or have taken place.  This 
view is also shared by the ICC judges, who have held that “the paramount 
criterion for determining admissibility of a case is the existence of a genuine 
investigation and prosecution at the national level in respect of the case.”35  
However, national proceedings do not automatically bar admissibility.  By 
way of the unwilling or unable exception, the drafters of the Rome Statute 
introduced a qualitative criterion, which enables the ICC to assess the 
genuineness of the national proceedings.36 
The standard of admissibility under the Rome Statute, therefore, consists 
of a two-part test.37  The Pre-Trial Chamber first considers whether national 
proceedings (in the form of an investigation or prosecution) are taking or 
have taken place.38  If the answer to this question is in the negative—in other 
words, there are no national proceedings—then there is no bar to 
admissibility.39  However, where there are national proceedings, then the 
second step’s qualitative assessment becomes relevant in determining an 
admissibility challenge.40  In carrying out the latter assessment, the Pre-Trial 
Judges will examine whether: (a) the national proceedings are being held to 
shield particular individuals from responsibility, (b) there has been inordinate 
delay that reveals the intent not to prosecute the person(s) concerned, or (c) 
the proceedings lack independence or impartiality.41  Similarly, a State will 
be found unable to prosecute where its judicial system has totally or 
substantially collapsed; where it fails to arrest the accused; where it fails to 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 36.  
 36 Robinson, supra note 31, at 71 (“[A]lthough much of the literature fixates exclusively on 
the ‘unwilling/unable’ test . . . the ‘unwilling/unable’ test is only an exception to the basic 
conditions specified in Article 17(1)(a), (b) and (c) . . . .”). 
 37 Id. at 87.  
 38 Id. at 85–87 (arguing that the drafting history of Article 17 supports the interpretation 
that “national proceedings” must entail an investigation or prosecution). 
 39 Id. at 87. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 2.  A good example of (a) and (b) above is 
Sudan’s establishment of a Special Criminal Court purportedly to try crimes committed in 
Darfur.  Sudan announced the establishment of the Court a day after the ICC Prosecutor’s 
announcement of his intention to open investigations into the Darfur situation, convincing many 
that the real objective of Sudan’s announcement was to oust the ICC’s jurisdiction.  See Lack of 
Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2006, 
at 5, 8; Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, Dec. 2005, at 68–69 (“The timing and speed of the tribunal’s establishment 
was another effort to defeat the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes in Darfur, as some Sudanese 
officials even acknowledged.”). 
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secure evidence; or is not able to get witnesses for the trial.42  In other words, 
although the Rome Statute gives primacy to national prosecutions, sham 
proceedings at the national level are insufficient to render a case inadmissible 
before the ICC. 
One could argue that, since Uganda referred the LRA case to the ICC in 
the exercise of its sovereign rights, there should be little or no debate about 
its cooperation with the ICC or, indeed, the appropriate forum for the LRA 
trial.  However, as mentioned earlier, political and legal developments in 
Uganda since the self-referral have raised various issues, including the 
government’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC, whether there is a legal 
basis for Uganda to withdraw the self-referral,43 and, most significantly, 
given the subsequent advances in peace negotiations and adoption of at least 
two agreements on domestic accountability, whether there is reason for the 
ICC to defer44 to Ugandan jurisdiction—at least for now. 
                                                                                                                   
 42 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 3 (“In order to determine inability in a 
particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”).  For 
example, in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, it noted Uganda’s argument that, for almost 
two decades, it “had been unable to secure [the] arrest” of Kony and others allegedly “bearing 
the greatest responsibility for the crimes” committed in Northern Uganda and Uganda’s 
assertion of this fact as a basis for its support of the LRA trial at the ICC.  See Kony Decision 
on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 37.  Arsanjani and Reisman argue that “[t]here is no 
evidence” that Uganda’s national judicial system had totally or substantially collapsed and, 
further, that the government’s inability to arrest “the accused or to conduct investigations in 
the north” has nothing to do with the national judicial system.  Arsanjani & Reisman, supra 
note 15, at 395.  However, that the government has been unable to arrest the LRA leaders for 
over twenty years is relevant to the admissibility of the case pursuant to the express terms of 
the Rome Statute. 
 43 The Rome Statute provides for the possibility that a State with jurisdiction may challenge 
the admissibility of a case.  Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19, para. 2.  Under Article 
19(2)(b), “[a] State which has jurisdiction over a case, [may challenge admissibility] on the 
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case [or has already done so].”  Id. art. 19, 
para. 2(b).  However, under Article 19(5), such a challenge must be made “at the earliest 
opportunity.”  Id. para. 5.  The Rome Statute, therefore, provides for both ex ante (i.e., before 
completion of domestic proceedings) and ex post (i.e., after domestic proceedings) challenges 
to admissibility at the ICC.  For Uganda, there is no basis for an ex ante challenge because 
there are no domestic proceedings regarding the LRA case.  See infra Part VII for a discussion 
of whether Uganda can bring an admissibility challenge after it conducts domestic 
proceedings. 
 44 See infra notes 157–67 and accompanying text (describing the possibility of deferral).  
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IV.  LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN UGANDA 
A.  The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Its Annexure 
As noted earlier, despite its referral to the ICC, the Ugandan government 
did not give up on the peace process.45  In November 2004, the government 
announced a unilateral ceasefire and invited the LRA to negotiate peace.46  
However, the talks collapsed the following month.47  Fresh talks opened in 
July 2006 and led to the successful negotiation of all agenda items,48 yet the 
terms have not resulted in a final peace deal.  Given the relative success of 
the peace talks, some have suggested that the only seeming obstacles to a 
peace deal are the ICC warrants.49  While this suggestion is hard to 
substantiate, considering the years of hostilities and the atmosphere of 
mutual suspicion between the Parties, the fact remains that the LRA has 
conditioned its signature on a withdrawal of the arrest warrants. 
The apparent chilling effect of the ICC arrest warrants on the peace 
process has prompted calls for the ICC to disengage from Uganda and for the 
government to seek alternative accountability options at the national level.50  
A wide array of domestic constituencies, including members of Parliament 
from Northern Uganda,51 religious and community leaders,52 civil society 
                                                                                                                   
 45 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (describing the peace process and 
providing Uganda’s rationale).  
 46 HEIDI ROSE & IRENE SATTARZADEH, LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, NORTHERN UGANDA: 
HUMAN SECURITY UPDATE 5 (2005), available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publicat 
ions/HSR-Northern_Uganda.pdf; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183.  
 47 ROSE & SATTARZADEH, supra note 46, at 5; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183. 
 48 Uganda Begins Ceasefire with LRA, BBC (Aug. 29, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5 
293630.stml; see also Apuuli, supra note 4, at 804 (listing the five agenda items agreed upon: 
“cessation of hostilities, comprehensive solutions to the conflict, accountability and 
reconciliation, formal cease-fire, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”). 
 49 Apuuli, supra note 4, at 804–05.  Reportedly, Vincent Otti, Deputy Leader of the LRA, 
stated: 
[T]he rebels [would never] sign any peace deal until the noose around their 
necks is loosened by [the] withdrawal of the arrest warrants . . . . [T]he ICC is 
the greatest obstacle . . . . Unless the warrants are withdrawn [the rebels] shall 
not leave for anywhere. . . . [O]n behalf of the LRA, I want to state that I will 
not sign any peace agreement in Juba which sends me to prison.  I can only 
sign an agreement that brings peace, not one that leads me to the ICC. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 50 Apuuli, supra note 2, at 184–85. 
 51 Apuuli, supra note 4, at 805. 
 52 H. Abigail Moy, Recent Development, The International Criminal Court’s Arrest 
Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the Debate over Amnesty and 
Complementarity, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 270 (2006) (noting, for example, that 
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organizations,53 and government officials54 have expressed concern and 
opposition to the ICC process.  These groups advocate the adoption of a 
combination of criminal proceedings and traditional justice approaches at the 
national level to deal with the LRA’s war-related crimes.55  It must be 
emphasized that these domestic voices do not call for impunity for the LRA; 
rather, being mindful of the current impasse over the peace process, they 
seek alternative accountability mechanisms that could contribute to the 
realization of both peace and justice. 
The groundswell of popular opinion for domestic accountability instead 
of ICC-based trials for the LRA provides both the context and explanation 
for the provisions of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
(the Agreement)56 and the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation (the Annexure).57  The Agreement expresses commitment to 
the principle of complementarity and is premised upon the twin objectives of 
accountability and reconciliation through “national legal arrangements.”58  It 
calls for both formal justice (criminal trials) and alternative justice 
mechanisms,59 especially traditional practices such as Mato Oput, Culo 
Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc, Tonu ci Koka, and Okukaraba.60  The 
Agreement is unclear about the category of perpetrators who will face 
formal, as opposed to traditional, justice, but it provides that the formal 
                                                                                                                   
“Archbishop Odama of the Gulu Catholic Archdiocese [indicated that] ‘[t]his is like a blow to 
the peace process.  The process of confidence-building has been moving well, but now the 
LRA will look at whoever gets in contact with them as an agent of the ICC.’ ” (citation 
omitted)); see also Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal 
Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 217 (2008) 
(noting opposition to ICC involvement by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative). 
 53 Apuuli, supra note 2, at 180. 
 54 Moy, supra note 52, at 270 (noting that Justice Peter Onega, the Chairman of Uganda’s 
Amnesty Commission, believes that the ICC warrants may have thwarted reconciliation 
efforts by driving away rebels who might have been disposed to accept the terms of the 
government amnesty).  
 55 Keller, supra note 52, at 217–18. 
 56 Agreement, supra note 6. 
 57 Annexure, supra note 6. 
 58 Agreement, supra note 6, pmbl., cl. 2.1. 
 59 Id. cl. 3.1 (calling for the promotion of “[t]raditional justice mechanisms . . . practiced in 
the communities affected by the conflict . . . as a central part of the framework for 
accountability and reconciliation”).   
 60 Id.; Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 21.  All of these traditional justice approaches place 
emphasis on admission, forgiveness, compensation, and reconciliation, rather than 
punishment.  See, e.g., Kimberly Hanlon, Comment, Peace or Justice: Now That Peace is 
Being Negotiated in Uganda, Will the ICC Still Pursue Justice?, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
295, 306 (2007) (“ ‘[M]ato oput’ . . . requires that the perpetrator of the crime admit 
wrongdoing to the victim, ask forgiveness, and pay compensation.”). 
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justice mechanisms shall apply to perpetrators of “serious crimes or human 
rights violations.”61  It also states that the formal courts shall have 
jurisdiction over persons who “bear particular responsibility for the most 
serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to international crimes.”62  
These provisions may suggest Uganda’s awareness of the need for 
perpetrators of serious international crimes, or those holding particular 
positions of leadership such that they are presumed to bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations, to face criminal prosecution rather than 
other forms of accountability.  However, the Agreement does not state this 
explicitly. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen how Ugandan prosecutors and judges will 
interpret these provisions.  One would hope that these requirements are 
meant to reflect the international legal standards found in the Statutes of 
similar war crimes courts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s 
“those bear[ing] the greatest responsibility,”63 or the Cambodia Court’s 
“those who [are] most responsible”64 for the perpetration of serious 
international crimes.  If those interpretations are adopted, it is likely that 
because of the positions they held and the influenced they exercised, Joseph 
Kony and the LRA leadership would have to face formal criminal 
proceedings before the Ugandan courts, rather than traditional justice. 
However, the legal situation remains unclear, and Uganda missed the 
opportunity to settle the division of labor between the formal and traditional 
justice mechanisms when it concluded the 2008 Annexure.65  In fact, the 
Annexure seems to introduce further confusion by providing that “serious 
crimes” will be tried by “the special Division of the High Court; traditional 
justice mechanisms; and any other alternative justice mechanism established 
under the [2007] Agreement.”66  Neither the Agreement nor the Annexure 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 4.1. 
 62 Id. cl. 6.1. 
 63 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.  The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone is an international criminal court established by an agreement 
between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to try perpetrators of serious 
international crimes during Sierra Leone’s civil war in the 1990s.  For the Special Court’s 
constitutive instrument, see Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 137. 
 64 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1 
(2002) (amended 2004). 
 65 Keller, supra note 52, at 219 (noting that the Annexure “raises as many questions as it 
answers regarding the exact shape of the alternative justice measures”).  
 66 Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 23. 
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defines “serious crimes,” but both consistently refer to formal and traditional 
justice processes as ways of securing accountability for the crimes 
committed during the conflict.67  This failure to clearly limit accountability 
for serious international crimes to formal (criminal), as opposed to traditional 
justice mechanisms, is perhaps one of the weakest links in Uganda’s attempt 
to construct a national accountability system for the LRA’s crimes.  The 
Agreement and Annexure, at best remain ambiguous on the question of a 
domestic accountability forum for serious crimes allegedly committed by the 
LRA.   
In 2009, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considered the effect of the 
Agreement and Annexure on the admissibility of the LRA case.68  The ICC 
invited observations from the ICC Prosecutor, the defense counsel, Uganda, 
and the victims (or their representatives),69 and received amici curiae briefs 
on the issue of admissibility.70  In his submissions, the ICC Prosecutor told 
the Court that the case remained admissible because there were no national 
proceedings in Uganda and noted that the question of admissibility was 
determined neither by ongoing peace negotiations nor the adoption of the 
Agreement and Annexure.71  Similarly, Uganda submitted that the case was 
admissible because the domestic legal processes provided for in the 
Agreement and Annexure will only come into force when the LRA signs a 
comprehensive peace agreement.72  Since the LRA had not signed any such 
peace deal, Uganda held the view that the Agreement and Annexure had “no 
legal force.”73 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 4.1 (“Formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be 
applied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes . . . .”); id. cl. 3.1 
(referring to “[t]raditional justice mechanisms . . . as a central part of the framework for 
accountability and reconciliation”); Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 7 (“A special division of the 
High Court of Uganda shall be established to try individuals who are alleged to have 
committed serious crimes during the conflict.”); id. cl. 19 (“Traditional justice shall form a 
central part of the alternative justice and reconciliation framework identified in the [2007] 
Agreement.”). 
 68 Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 2. 
 69 Under the Rome Statute, “where the personal interests of . . . victims are affected,” the 
ICC may, at any stage of the proceedings it deems appropriate, hear the views of victims.  
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68, para. 3.  Such views may be presented by the “legal 
representatives of the victims,” in a manner that is not prejudicial to, or inconsistent with, the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.  Id. 
 70 Id. paras. 1–2. 
 71 Id. para. 5. 
 72 Id. para. 8. 
 73 Id. 
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The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the case was admissible despite the 
existence of the Agreement and Annexure.74  In doing so, the Chamber 
clarified that pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, “once the 
jurisdiction of the Court is triggered, it is for the [Chamber] and not for any 
national judicial authorities . . . to make a binding determination on the 
admissibility of a given case.”75  This pronouncement removes all doubt 
about Uganda’s perceived power or ability to withdraw its referral.  Simply 
stated, the above jurisprudence shows that ICC law does not permit such 
withdrawals.  It was necessary for the Chamber to address and clarify this 
issue of Uganda’s ability to withdraw the referral, because Uganda had made 
ambiguous submissions regarding the relationship between the ICC and the 
Special Division of the High Court of Uganda, which was established under 
Article 7 of the Annexure to try persons alleged to have committed “serious 
crimes” during the conflict.76  In addition, the Chamber stated, obiter dictum, 
that complementarity is the “cornerstone of the [Rome] Statute” and that it is 
the principle that reconciles “the States’ persisting duty to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes with the establishment of [the ICC with 
jurisdiction] over the same crimes.”77  It added that “admissibility is the 
criterion which enables the determination, in respect of a given case, whether 
it is for a national jurisdiction or the [ICC] to proceed.”78  Furthermore, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber cited an earlier Pre-Trial decision to the effect that in 
order for a case in which national proceedings had commenced to be 
inadmissible before the ICC, the “national proceedings must encompass both 
the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the 
[ICC].”79 
On the specific question of the admissibility of the LRA case, the Pre-
Trial Chamber noted that at the time of its decision, various institutional and 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. paras. 52–53. 
 75 Id. para. 45. 
 76 Annexure, supra note 6, art. 7.  In response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request for 
responses on the admissibility of the case, Uganda had submitted, inter alia, that the Special 
Division of the High Court, “is not meant to supplant the work of the [ICC] and accordingly, 
those individuals who were indicted by the [ICC] will have to be brought before the special 
division of the High Court for trial.”  See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-
01/05-286-Anx2, Request for Information from the Republic of Uganda on the Status of 
Execution of the Warrants of Arrest (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc4 
61285.pdf. 
 77 Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 34. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. para. 17 (citing Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Prosecutor v. Bosco 
Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-118, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case, paras. 29–41).  
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legal developments were taking place in Uganda.80  However, since those 
developments could not be qualified as domestic proceedings, they could not 
bar admissibility.81  The Pre-Trial Chamber added that the Rome Statute 
“does not rule out multiple determinations of admissibility,”82 and, therefore, 
it may be possible for Uganda or any of the parties to bring a future 
admissibility challenge on the ground that new facts or circumstances, 
including domestic proceedings, had arisen in Uganda.83 
B.  The International Criminal Court Act 
In March 2010, the Ugandan Parliament passed the International Criminal 
Court Act (ICC Act).84  The ICC Act received presidential assent on May 25, 
2010 and entered into force a month later.85  Uganda’s ICC Act provides, 
inter alia, for the trial and “punishment of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes”; Uganda’s cooperation with the ICC in the investigation, 
arrest, detention, and surrender of persons wanted or convicted by the ICC; 
ICC trials to be held in Uganda; and the enforcement of sentences imposed 
by the ICC.86  The ICC Act also grants privileges and immunities necessary 
for the ICC’s work in Uganda.87 
The ICC Act makes the provisions of the Rome Statute applicable to 
Ugandan national law.88  It allows Uganda to undertake the legal steps 
necessary domestically to implement its Rome Statute obligations regarding 
the investigation, and the arrest, transfer, prosecution, and punishment of 
persons before the ICC.89  As far as determining a forum choice for the LRA 
trial, one consequence of the ICC Act would be to require Uganda to hand 
over the LRA leadership to the ICC Prosecutor.90  However, the trial 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Id. paras. 47–48. 
 81 Id. paras. 51–52. 
 82 Id. para. 25. 
 83 Id. paras. 25–29. 
 84 MICHAEL OTIM & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, UGANDA: 
IMPACT OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf. 
 85 International Criminal Court Act (2010) (Uganda), available at http://www.ucicc.org/doc 
uments/Legal/ICC%20Act%202010.pdf.  
 86 Id. § 2. 
 87 Id. § 101. 
 88 Id. § 2(a). 
 89 Id. § 20(1)(a); see generally id. pts. III–IV (providing for various forms of cooperation on 
the part of the government of Uganda in furtherance of the ICC’s work in the country). 
 90 Id. § 26. 
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following such transfer could take place either in Kampala or at The 
Hague.91 
On the other hand, as discussed above, the Agreement and Annexure 
place emphasis on domestic processes of accountability by creating a Special 
Division of the High Court of Uganda to try war-related crimes and 
traditional justice processes for certain categories of perpetrators.92  The 
differences in the two criminal justice regimes, however, become less 
significant when one takes a long-term view of criminal accountability for 
serious international crimes in Uganda.  From that perspective, it is clear that 
the ICC Act is lex generalis; its object is to govern relationships, writ large, 
between Uganda and the ICC.  The Agreement and Annexure, on the other 
hand, are lex specialis; they deal with the unique legal and political 
challenges posed by the LRA case.  In the long run, then, the ICC Act will 
likely supplant the regime under the Agreement and Annexure, especially 
after the trial of the LRA leadership.  
Regarding traditional justice, the various customary mechanisms 
recognized by the Agreement and Annexure have formed an important fabric 
of local culture and society in Northern Uganda over many generations.  
From that perspective, the provisions of the Agreement and Annexure 
dealing with traditional justice have an inherently legitimate character as 
instruments of dispute settlement, reconciliation, and social harmony at the 
local level.93  Whichever way one looks at it, traditional justice must form 
part of the panoply of accountability options with which to address the 
crimes committed in Uganda.  However, given traditional justice’s emphasis 
on forgiveness, reconciliation, and compensation, rather than punishment,94 
and considering the serious crimes for which the LRA have been accused, 
there is perhaps a need to selectively combine traditional justice approaches 
with other accountability options, including national trials for senior LRA 
leaders, and truth and reconciliation commissions95 for lower-level 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id. § 91 (providing for sittings of the ICC to take place in Uganda). 
 92 See supra notes 58–59, 66–67 and accompanying text.  
 93 See Hanlon, supra note 60, at 315–16 (“Traditional justice in Uganda balances ‘the need 
to punish individuals for their crimes . . . against the need to restore wholeness to the 
community.’ . . . Traditional justice calls for restoring harmony in the community.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 94 See, e.g., id. at 306 (describing the mato oput process). 
 95 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are investigative proceedings where 
alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses and other violations testify openly about and 
admit their crimes, usually in the presence of victims, and ask for forgiveness.  In exchange 
for their admissions and plea for forgiveness, perpetrators could be granted amnesty from 
prosecution, or be ordered to pay or perform other kinds of reparation.  Unlike criminal trials 
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perpetrators.  Combining traditional justice with other accountability options, 
has the added merit of promoting both accountability and reconciliation as 
overarching objectives of the government and people of Uganda. 
The first option would be for Uganda to adopt a parallel accountability 
process, whereby Kony and other LRA leaders for whom arrest warrants 
have been issued by the ICC will be tried at the Special Division of the High 
Court for crimes against humanity and war crimes based on internationally 
recognized standards.96  If convicted, these LRA leaders must receive prison 
terms consistent with the sanctions regime under the Rome Statute.  
Alongside these trials, lower-level perpetrators who fall outside of the 
leadership category, or whose crimes are not particularly grave, could be 
subjected to traditional justice processes.  This option has the merit of 
preserving the interests of those who advocate for both peace and justice 
within Uganda’s domestic judiciary.97  Indeed, the idea of parallel 
accountability processes is built into several sections of the Agreement.  For 
example, the Agreement makes provision for the utilization “of formal and 
non formal institutions and measures for ensuring justice and reconciliation 
with respect to [crimes committed during] the conflict.”98  Similarly, it calls 
for an “overarching justice framework” under which both formal criminal 
justice and traditional justice mechanisms would play a role in the processes 
of accountability and reconciliation.99 
The second option is to hold national trials for the LRA leadership and 
subject the lower-level perpetrators, such as former child soldiers, who might 
have committed crimes against their own communities or families, to a truth 
                                                                                                                   
which are meant to punish perpetrators, the overall objectives of TRCs are to promote peace, 
reconciliation and healing in post-conflict societies, and to maintain a historical record of past 
wrongdoing.  Recent examples in Africa include the TRC established to investigate 
Apartheid-era crimes in South Africa, and the TRC established in Sierra Leone after a decade-
long civil war in the 1990s.  For details on these two TRCs see TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMM’N, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (2003), 
available at http://www.info.gov.za; SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 
WITNESS TO TRUTH (2004), available at http://www.Sierra-Leone.org/TRCDocuments.html. 
 96 See, e.g., Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 6.1 (providing in relevant part that “individuals 
who . . . bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes 
amounting to international crimes” shall be tried before “[f]ormal courts provided for under 
the Constitution”). 
 97 Okello, supra note 12, at 2 (“On the other hand, the rationale for a ‘peace first, justice 
later’ position is quite simple: It is a matter of sequencing.  And, sequencing should be 
distinguished from prioritization. . . . Whichever way you look at it, trying to ensure that the 
environment is conducive for a comprehensive pursuit of justice . . . is definitive proof that 
you want real justice to be done.”).  
 98 Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 2.1. 
 99 Id. cl. 5.2 
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and reconciliation commission.100 This approach would be particularly 
suitable in a situation like Uganda where the line between perpetrators and 
victims is often blurred.101 
The third option is for those ostensibly bearing the greatest responsibility 
for crimes committed in Northern Uganda, including Kony and his rebel 
leadership, to be tried at the ICC.102  Alongside these international trials, a 
combination of domestic accountability processes, including national trials at 
the Special Division of the High Court, traditional justice, and reconciliation 
mechanisms could be put in place and targeted to other alleged perpetrators 
depending upon the nature of the allegations against them. This would be 
consistent with the ICC Prosecutor’s policy,103 as well as the expectations of 
international human rights activists for accountability based on Uganda’s 
self-referral in 2003.104  As Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit and 
nongovernmental organization, has argued, the search for a durable peace in 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. cl. 12(iv) (stating that “children are not subjected to criminal justice proceedings, but 
may participate, as appropriate, in reconciliation processes”).  Similarly, clauses 10 and 11 of 
the Agreement call for a “gender-sensitive approach,” that the “special needs of women and 
girls” are addressed, and that their “dignity, privacy and security” are protected in the 
processes of justice and reconciliation envisaged under the Agreement.  Id.  cls. 10, 11(i), 
11(iii). 
 101 For discussions on the forceful recruitment or abduction of children into the LRA, see 
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183; Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 407; Hanlon, supra note 60, at 301. 
 102 Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 37 (Mar. 10, 2009) (quoting the 
statement by the Solicitor-General of Uganda that the ICC was “ ‘the most appropriate and 
effective forum for the investigation and prosecution of those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the crimes [committed in Uganda]’ ” (citation omitted)). 
 103 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE 7 (2007) [hereinafter POLICY PAPER], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyre 
s/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422bb23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (“The 
OTP has clearly stated its policy of focusing its investigations on those bearing the greatest 
degree of responsibility.  Factors to be taken into account include the alleged status or 
hierarchical level of the accused or implication in particularly serious or notorious crimes.  
That is, the significance of the role of the accused in the overall commission of crimes and the 
degree of the accused’s involvement (actual commission, ordering, indirect participation).”); 
see also Uganda: Interview with ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, INTEGRATED REG’L 
INFO. NETWORKS (June 9, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54856 (noting 
the Prosecutor’s acknowledgment that investigation and prosecutions will focus on those 
limited number of individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for committing the most 
serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the court). 
 104 See Elise Keppler & Richard Dicker, Trading Justice for Peace in Uganda Won’t Work, 
UGANDA DAILY MONITOR (May 3, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/05/02/trading-justic 
e-peace-uganda-won-t-work (“[T]o achieve . . . peace, the warring parties and the mediators 
cannot bargain away prosecution of the LRA leaders who have been charged with grave 
crimes.  Simply put, a solution that avoids meaningful justice will undercut the prospects for a 
durable peace.”). 
2011]        UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY  87 
 
 
Uganda must entail “both a peace agreement and fair, credible prosecutions 
of those responsible for the most serious crimes committed . . . during the 
conflict.”105   
Given the context of ongoing conflict in the country, the differing views 
of advocates of peace versus advocates of justice, the tensions between 
traditional and Western forms of justice and between domestic and 
international systems, as well as the need to consider alternative forms of 
accountability like truth commissions for certain categories of perpetrators, 
Uganda cannot afford to shut out any of the accountability options.  Arriving 
at the right balance with respect to these options would be a complex, time-
consuming exercise.  In order to succeed, Uganda and the ICC must align 
their priorities and recognize that neither the international call for justice 
against the LRA nor the domestic need for a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict, can be easily shrugged off as irrelevant or insignificant. 
V.  THE CASE FOR UGANDA-BASED TRIALS 
In light of the current impasse over the final peace agreement and the 
position of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber that the LRA case remains admissible 
before the ICC, are there good reasons to suggest that Uganda-based trials 
hold the best promise for achieving both peace and justice?  The inability 
thus far of the parties to reach a final peace settlement means that war-
ravaged Ugandans continue to face an unsettling political situation.  
Similarly, the theoretical existence of various accountability options, when 
viewed in light of Uganda’s inability to arrest Kony, implies that the ICC 
warrants have become the proverbial “Sword of Damocles” hanging not only 
over the head of the LRA, but also over the entire peace process.  
Unfortunately, the victim population of Northern Uganda who helplessly 
continue to suffer the effects of over two decades of inexplicable violence is 
trapped between a group of brutal rebels and the political elite.  This is 
particularly true of the Acholi ethnic group, whose sentiments remain 
understandably divided over the issue.106  It is Acholi children who, in the 
main, have been forcibly abducted and turned into child soldiers by the 
LRA.107  Therefore, while many Acholi would like to see some form of 
                                                                                                                   
 105 House of Commons Select Committee on International Development Inquiry “Prospects for 
Sustainable Peace in Uganda,” HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2 
007/07/16/house-commons-select-committee-international-development-inquiry-prospects-sustai  
nab [hereinafter House of Commons]. 
 106 Keller, supra note 52, at 225. 
 107 Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 411–12.  
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accountability for Kony and his henchmen, they would also want to see a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict so that their sons and daughters can return 
home.108  This is just one illustration of the complex interplay of interests and 
factors that require careful consideration in dealing with the LRA case. 
There is a strong body of public opinion in Uganda that supports dropping 
the ICC warrants and the use of alternative accountability mechanisms for 
the LRA’s crimes.109  In other words, Ugandans are not advocating impunity 
for the rebel leadership; however, as the people most directly affected by the 
conflict, they prefer that the quest for justice be appropriately timed and 
carried out in a manner that does not defeat the prospects for peace.110  It has 
been reported that the majority of Members of Parliament from Northern 
Uganda hold the view that the ICC warrants should be dropped in favor of 
traditional justice mechanisms.111  Similarly, leading figures such as former 
Minister in Museveni’s government and longtime peace negotiator Betty 
Bigombe,112 the head of the Uganda Amnesty Commission,113 and religious 
leaders from Northern Uganda, including the Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative,114 have all expressed concern that the arrest warrants could 
adversely affect chances of a negotiated settlement and dissuade the rebels 
from responding to a final peace initiative.  Moreover, traditional Acholi 
leaders, from whose community the LRA draws most of its members, but 
who also constitute the largest population of victims of the LRA’s crimes,115 
have made no secret of their preference for traditional justice and 
reconciliation over the ICC process.116  Rwot Onen David Acana II, 
Paramount Chief of the Acholi, stated “ ‘The best way to resolve the . . . war 
in our region is through poro lok ki mato oput (peace talks and 
reconciliation) as it’s in the Acholi culture . . . . [T]he Acholi do not buy their 
idea of taking [Kony] to court.’ ”117  During his visit to Northern Uganda in 
                                                                                                                   
 108 Keller, supra note 52, at 224. 
 109 See, e.g., Apuuli, supra note 2, at 184–85 (citing religious leaders, members of the 
Amnesty Commission, and local politicians as having expressed disapproval of the ICC’s 
involvement in Uganda). 
 110 See Okello, supra note 12, at 2 (calling for appropriate sequencing of peace and justice).  
 111 Apuuli, supra note 4, at 805. 
 112 Apuuli, supra note 2, at 185 (noting remarks by Bigombe that as a result of rushed nature 
of the ICC warrants “there is now no hope of getting the LRA commanders to surrender” 
(citation omitted)). 
 113 Moy, supra note 52, at 270. 
 114 Keller, supra note 52, at 217. 
 115 Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 411–12. 
 116 Goldstone, supra note 31, at 774. 
 117 Id. (citation omitted).  Scholar Alex Little explains consequences of favoring accountability 
over victim autonomy:  
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2006, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian 
Affairs, Jan Egeland, noted that most stakeholders in the Ugandan peace 
process felt that the ICC warrants “ ‘should be dropped against the LRA 
leaders so that a peaceful conclusion to the talks can be reached.’ ”118 
In addition, there are compelling criminal justice arguments in favor of 
national trials.  It is uncontroverted that most of the LRA’s crimes were 
committed in Uganda, the victims and perpetrators are Ugandan, and almost 
all of the potential witnesses and forensic evidence are to be found in 
Uganda.  Both from the point of view of traditional international law119 and 
the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute,120 Uganda’s jurisdiction to 
try the LRA is unquestionable.  Moreover, investigations and trial 
management would be less cumbersome, more cost effective, and hopefully 
speedier if the trials were held in Uganda. 
There are also inherent legitimacy gains in having Ugandan perpetrators 
of serious crimes face justice at the hands of fellow Ugandans, as well as in 
the presence of victims and families.121  Ugandan investigators, prosecutors, 
                                                                                                                   
First, when victims oppose prosecution, their safety and that of the 
community might not be improved by a blanket policy that favors 
prosecution. . . .  Second, prosecutors send mixed messages when they 
proceed with prosecution against victims’ wishes.  The constructive signal of 
accountability often is paired with destructive portrayals of uncooperative 
victims as weak, irrational, or helpless. 
Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal 
Court, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 363–64 (2007).  Little concludes that “although prosecution 
can impose significant costs on individual victims and victimized communities, this risk may 
be necessary to ensure that grave crimes never again are committed with impunity.”  Id. at 
354.  Clearly, Little favors aggressive prosecution on the basis of its deterrent potential.  
Unfortunately, as experience has shown, it is hard to prove empirically that aggressive 
prosecution always leads to deterrence.  In the context of Uganda, the question is not so much 
whether to prosecute Kony and the LRA leaders, as much as where such prosecution should 
take place—within traditional society, in national courts, or at the ICC. 
 118 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, 
and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 116 (2009) (citation omitted).  
Further, the Catholic archdiocese’s Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu stated that “ ‘[t]o 
start war crimes investigations for the sake of justice at a time when the war is not yet over, 
risks having, in the end, neither justice nor peace delivered.’ ”  Arsanjani & Reisman, supra 
note 15, at 385 (citation omitted). 
 119 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300–07 (7th ed. 2008) 
(discussing the traditional bases for criminal jurisdiction recognized under international law). 
 120 Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.  
 121 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, para. 34, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 
23, 2004) (“While the international community is obliged to act directly for the protection of 
human rights and human security where conflict has eroded or frustrated the domestic rule of 
law, in the long term, no ad hoc, temporary or external measures can ever replace a 
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and judges must be presumed to have a better understanding of the historical 
and political context of the conflict.122  The ability of victims and families to 
bear witness to, and participate in, proceedings against those who have so 
egregiously violated their most basic human rights could facilitate a better 
understanding of the justice process by victims and survivors and lead to 
their acceptance of the proceedings.  As seen in other conflict situations, 
victims of large-scale atrocities such as those in Uganda, generally favor the 
idea that, given the scale and degree of the crimes committed against them, 
some form of justice, albeit an imperfect one, is preferable to no justice at 
all.123 
From the point of view of deterrence, it has been argued that national 
trials for perpetrators of serious international crimes contribute more 
effectively to preventing the recurrence of similar crimes in the future.  For 
example, in the context of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, at least one commentator 
has argued that the establishment and experience of the mixed international 
tribunals in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo show “that justice 
delivered close to the affected societies in Rwanda or Former Yugoslavia is 
far more effective than in the remote confines of Arusha or The Hague.”124  
Ideally, successful trials of the LRA in Uganda would not only contribute to 
deterrence, but also enhance prospects for national reconciliation upon which 
a sustainable peace can be built.125  Finally, one cannot overstate the positive 
                                                                                                                   
functioning national justice system.”). 
 122 See, e.g., id. para. 16 (“Local consultation enables a better understanding of the dynamics 
of past conflict, patterns of discrimination and types of victims.”).  
 123 In the context of the ICTY, for example, Diane Orentlicher has found that, while many 
victims and survivors were not totally satisfied by the cost, speed, indictments issued, or 
sentences imposed by the ICTY, they also accept the idea that the justice administered by the 
ICTY, imperfect as it may be, is better than no justice at all.  See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, 
INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF 
THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 14 (2010). 
 124 Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience in 
Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 91 (2005). 
 125 House of Commons, supra note 105 (“Prosecutions send the message . . . to would-be 
perpetrators, that no one is above the law.  This can help consolidate respect for the rule of 
law and contribute to deterring future abuses, thereby helping to cement peace and stability.”); 
see also Kamatali, supra note 124, at 91–92.  Kamatali, former Dean of Law at the National 
University of Rwanda, argues,  
For the Rwandan community, on the sides of both the victim and the 
perpetrator, the justice and deterrence expected from the ICTR results not 
only from knowing that Akayesu, Kambanda or Bagosora . . . have been 
condemned.  More importantly, it also results from witnessing the process 
through which they lost their positions of power, authority and harm.  
Id. at 92. 
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effects of such trials on the rule of law in Uganda, as well as on the potential 
for capacity building of Uganda’s legal institutions to deal with serious 
international crimes. 
In order for Uganda to successfully undertake these prosecutions and 
stand any chance of meeting the inadmissibility requirements of the Rome 
Statute, it must first strengthen its national legal framework for the trial of 
serious international crimes.  In its endeavor “to map out the contours of 
acceptable domestic proceedings,”126 Uganda can learn useful lessons from 
the experience of the ICTR regarding the prosecutor’s application to transfer 
cases for trial in Rwandan courts.  These lessons are relevant because the 
ICTR, like other international justice institutions established to deal with 
grave atrocities, sets not only global, but also national standards of justice.  
In the words of one commentator, such institutions define “what domestic 
criminal justice should look like for adjudicating crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes.”127 
VI.  LESSONS FROM THE ICTR EXPERIENCE 
The ICTR Prosecutor’s applications to refer cases to Rwanda for trial and 
Uganda’s desire to try the LRA case in its national courts, both concern the 
application of the general principle of concurrent jurisdiction between 
national and international courts, although there are important legal and 
factual differences that must be taken into account. 
First, as stated earlier, while the ICTR enjoys primacy over Rwanda 
regarding the trial of cases falling within the ICTR’s jurisdiction, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction only kicks in as a last resort when the inadmissibility conditions 
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute are satisfied.128  In addition to the 
statutory distinction between primacy and complementarity,129 a second 
distinction is the fact that at the time of ruling on the Prosecutor’s referral 
                                                                                                                   
 126 William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: 
The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 257, 278 (2009). 
 127 Blumenson, supra note 9, at 805.  
 128 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17.  
 129 Under the Statute of the ICTR, the U.N Security Council has conferred on that Court the 
primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  For this reason, the Tribunal can ask 
national courts to defer to its jurisdiction.  ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 8, paras. 1–2.  On 
the other hand, the principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute, implies that the 
primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
lies with States and the ICC can only take action where the national jurisdiction fails to 
investigate or prosecute.  Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.  
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requests, the ICTR had most of the indictees in its custody.130  It was, 
therefore, easier for the ICTR Judges to impose conditions on their transfer 
to national jurisdiction.131  This situation stands in stark contrast to Uganda’s 
twenty-year inability to arrest the LRA leadership.132  While Uganda seems 
to want to sequence peace over justice, the ICC insists on implementing its 
statutory mandate of bringing to justice those allegedly bearing responsibility 
for serious international crimes.  This provides a third important distinction 
with the Rwanda situation, where the war ended in 1994 and by the time the 
ICTR judges ruled on the Prosecutor’s referral requests, both the national 
and international systems were singularly focused on bringing the 
perpetrators to justice.133 
Despite these differences, however, the normative architecture that the 
ICTR judges established for the trial of serious international crimes at the 
domestic level could provide useful lessons for Uganda’s emerging criminal 
justice system vis-à-vis the LRA trials.  After all, like Rwanda, Uganda is 
another African country grappling with the effects of large-scale violence 
                                                                                                                   
 130 President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Letter dated Dec. 8, 2006 from the 
President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the U.N. 
Sec. Council, paras. 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/2006/951 (Dec. 8, 2006) (informing the Security 
Council that, at the date of his report, trials involving 58 persons had either been completed or 
were in progress; 11 detainees were awaiting trial; and 18 indictees were at large). 
 131 See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of Norway, para. 5 (May 19, 2006), http://ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/Bagaragaza/decisions/190506.html [hereinafter 
Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision] (noting that the considerations for ruling on a motion for 
referral include “the jurisdiction, willingness and preparedness of the Referral State” and “the 
ability of the Referral State to conduct a fair trial”). 
 132 The government of Uganda’s inability to arrest the LRA leadership or bring the war to an 
end is a well-known fact.  Due to this inability, in October 2011, U.S. President Barack 
Obama authorized the deployment of about one hundred special force soldiers to help 
Ugandan and African Union troops track down Kony. The U.S. forces will not engage in 
combat, but will rather serve in an advisory and support role.  See ALEXIS ARIEFF & LAUREN 
PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42094, THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: THE UNITED STATES 
RESPONSE (2011).   
 133 ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 8, para. 1.  The Resolution notes, inter alia, that serious 
crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, had been committed in 
Rwanda and that this “constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security.”  Id. pmbl.  
Although Rwanda initially called for and supported the establishment of the ICTR to 
prosecute those allegedly responsible for the commission of these crimes, as a non-permanent 
member of the U.N. Security Council in 1994, the country ended up voting against the U.N.’s 
resolution due to disagreements over the seat of the ICTR and the non-applicability of the 
death penalty.  See, e.g., Parker Patterson, Comment, Partial Justice: Successes and Failures 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Ending Impunity for Violations of 
International Criminal Law, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 372 (2010) (noting Rwanda’s 
“objections regarding the structure, jurisdiction, and location of the tribunal”). 
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within its borders.  But, while neighboring Rwanda’s attempt to ensure 
accountability for genocide and other serious violations of international law 
took place in a post-conflict setting, Uganda faces an ongoing conflict, and, 
given the equally important goal of securing a lasting peace in the country, 
the accountability process remains delicate.  Yet, the internal nature of both 
conflicts, the quest for domestic rather than international accountability for 
grave crimes, debates about the maturity of their respective criminal justice 
systems to deal with wide-scale atrocities, and perceptions about victors’ 
justice in both contexts, mean that Uganda can learn useful lessons from the 
Rwandan experience. 
The cornerstone of the normative architecture for referral of cases from 
the ICTR to national jurisdiction is contained in Rule 11 bis of the ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the various decisions of the Trial and 
Appeals Chamber (Appeals Chamber) that interpret it.134  As there is no 
question about Uganda’s primary jurisdiction to try the LRA—save for the 
self-referral—this section focuses on the standards which the ICTR judges 
have, in their interpretation of Rule 11 bis, set for national proceedings to 
satisfy international legal standards.  
A.  Trials Must Be for International, Not Ordinary, Crimes 
In dealing with the Prosecutor’s first-ever Rule 11 bis request for referral 
to national jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, the ICTR Appeal 
Chamber held that the conduct for which the accused is charged, must 
constitute an international crime under the law of the referral state.135  
According to the Appeals Chamber, the ICTR’s statutory authority permits 
referral only for prosecution as serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, not for prosecution as ordinary crimes.136  Thus, the 
Appeals Chamber held, confirming the decision of the Trial Chamber, that 
Bagaragaza’s case could not be referred to Norway.137  The Appeals 
                                                                                                                   
 134 Rule 11 bis provides that a referral can only be made to “a State: (i) in whose territory the 
crime was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) [which has] 
jurisdiction and [is] willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.”  Int’l Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3.REV.1, r. 11bis(A) 
(June 29, 1995) (as amended Feb. 9, 2010), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100 
209.pdf.  In determining a request for referral, the Trial Chamber is required to consider 
whether “the accused will receive a fair trial . . . and that the death penalty will not be imposed 
or carried out.”  Id. r. 11bis(C). 
 135 Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 131, para. 16. 
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
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Chamber reasoned that, unlike in the ICTR where Bagaragaza would have 
been tried for genocide, the Norwegian penal code only permitted his trial for 
the ordinary crime of homicide.138  
If the trials in Uganda are to meet international legal standards, including 
the inadmissibility requirements of the Rome Statute, the LRA leaders must 
be tried for serious international crimes, including crimes against humanity 
and war crimes as contained in the ICC warrants.  In this regard, it is 
important to note that Uganda’s recently passed ICC Act provides for the 
prosecution of serious international crimes.139  However, in moving forward, 
Uganda must not only clarify the ambiguous term “serious crimes” under the 
Agreement and Annexure, but must reconcile that notion with the ICC Act 
which specifically provides for the trial of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. 
B.  Uganda Must Conduct Fair Trials 
The ICTR jurisprudence under Rule 11 bis also provides useful guidance 
on relevant fair trial standards that must be adhered to when serious 
international crimes are prosecuted at the domestic level.140  In addition to 
independent and impartial judges, the domestic legal framework must afford 
equality of arms to the prosecution and defense.  The legal system must 
protect the rights of the accused during trial, including the right to call 
witnesses to testify in his or her defense, to secure the assistance of counsel 
(if necessary, at the expense of the State), and not to be compelled to testify 
against himself or herself or to confess guilt.141 
                                                                                                                   
 138 Id. paras. 14–15, 17.  But see Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis, para. 12 
(Dec. 4, 2008), http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/Hategekimana/decision 
s/081204.pdf [hereinafter Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision] (holding that this 
requirement is limited to the substantive offence charged, and not a mode of liability). 
 139 International Criminal Court Act, supra note 85, § 2 (“The purpose of this act is . . . (c) to 
make further provision in Uganda’s law for the punishment of the international crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.”). 
 140 See Uganda: Any Alternative to the ICC Should Meet Key Benchmarks, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (May 31, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/05/30/Uganda-any-alternative-icc-sh 
ould-meet-key-benchmarks (arguing that national alternatives to the ICC must entail 
“credible, independent and impartial investigation and prosecution; rigorous adherence in 
principle and practice to international fair trial standards; and penalties that are appropriate 
and reflect the gravity of the crimes”). 
 141 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67 (detailing the rights of the accused under the 
Rome Statute); ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 20 (detailing the rights of the accused under 
the ICTR Statute). 
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In this context, the jurisprudence of the ICTR holds that the accused must 
be able “to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.”142  
Further, the ICTR holds that trials in Rwanda would be unfair where 
witnesses living in that country were found to be unwilling to testify for the 
defense due to fear that they may face serious consequences, including 
threats, harassment, torture, arrest, or being killed.143  Similarly, the ICTR 
case law holds that Rwanda-based trials would be unfair in circumstances 
where the majority of defense witnesses live outside the country and would 
be afraid to testify in Rwanda.144   
Although Rwanda and the ICTR Prosecutor both argued that the domestic 
legal framework provided alternative facilities, such as video-link 
technology, for the testimony of witnesses who are either unwilling or unable 
to travel to Rwanda, the judges were unconvinced that the existence of such 
facilities would provide a sufficient remedy.145  The judges recalled their 
experience with cases tried at the ICTR, where a large majority of defense 
                                                                                                                   
 142 ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 20, para. 4(e); Hategekimana Appellate Chamber 
Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, para. 31 
(Oct. 30, 2008), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKanyarukiga%5Cdicisions% 
5C081030.pdf [hereinafter Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision]; Prosecutor v. 
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against 
Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, para. 40 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/ 
Case/English/Munyakazi/decisions/081008.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Appellate Chamber 
Decision]. 
 143 Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 22; Munyakazi 
Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 45; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber 
Decision, supra note 142, para. 34; Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, 
Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, para. 72 (Nov. 17, 
2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Gatete/decisions/081117.pdf [hereinafter 
Gatete Trial Chamber Decision]. 
 144 Gatete Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 143, paras. 65–72; Prosecutor v. 
Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral 
to the Republic of Rwanda, paras. 76–77 (June 6, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/ 
English/Kanyarukiga/decisions/080606.pdf [hereinafter Kanyarukiga Trial Chamber 
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-0055B-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, 
para. 71 (June 19, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Hategekimana/decisio 
ns/080619.pdf [hereinafter Hategekimana Trial Chamber Decision]; Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, 
Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda,  paras. 63–66 (May 28, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/Eng 
lish/Munyakazi/decisions/080528.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Trial Chamber Decision]. 
 145 Hategekimana Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 144, paras. 70–71; Kanyarukiga Trial 
Chamber Decision, supra note 144, paras. 78–79; Munyakazi Trial Chamber Decision, supra 
note 144, paras. 65–66. 
96 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:67 
 
witnesses travelled to testify in Arusha from places outside Rwanda, and 
ruled that the utilization of video-link technology could result in a situation 
where the majority of prosecution witnesses are heard directly by the 
Chamber, while most defense evidence is only heard indirectly, through 
video-link testimony.146  The judges held that this imbalance would violate 
the principle of equality of arms and render the trial unfair since the rights of 
the accused to obtain the attendance of witnesses and to examine witnesses 
under the same conditions as witnesses for the prosecution would be 
violated.147 
In addition, it is important that defense teams be able to work in a 
conducive environment that enables them to carry out investigations, access 
documents, and secure witnesses for trial.148  In the Kanyarukiga case, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber held that difficulties experienced by defense counsel 
in obtaining documents and meeting potential witnesses, especially detainees 
in Rwanda, showed that “working conditions for the Defence may be 
difficult” and this could affect the fair trial rights of the accused.149 
Uganda must also establish an independent and impartial witness 
protection program, which is accessible by both parties.  In this respect, the 
ICTR case law holds that where a witness protection service was located in 
the office of Rwanda’s Prosecutor General and complaints of witness 
harassment must be reported to the police, potential defense witnesses may 
be afraid to avail themselves of its services, thereby undermining the 
prospects of a fair trial.150 
C.  There Must Be an Adequate Penalty Structure 
The ICTR case law also lays down that ambiguity regarding the penalty 
structure governing serious international crimes, may render a domestic legal 
framework inadequate to try such offenses.  In the Bagaragaza case, one of 
the reasons implicit in the Trial Chamber’s denial of the Prosecutor’s referral 
request to Norway was that Bagaragaza would only face a maximum term of 
twenty-one years imprisonment if tried as an accessory to homicide or for 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Gatete Trial 
Chamber Decision, supra note 143, paras. 70–72; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision, 
supra note 142, para. 33; Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 42.  
 147 Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Gatete Trial 
Chamber Decision, supra note 143, para. 72; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision, 
supra note 142, para. 34; Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 43.  
 148 Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 21. 
 149 Id. paras. 19, 21. 
 150 Id. paras. 26–27. 
2011]        UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY  97 
 
 
negligent homicide under Norwegian law, rather than life imprisonment 
following a genocide trial at the ICTR.151  Similarly, in the Munyakazi and 
Kanyarukiga cases, the Trial and Appeals Chambers both held that ambiguity 
regarding which one (of two) penalty regimes in Rwandan law would govern 
cases transferred under Rule 11 bis raised the possibility that life 
imprisonment in isolation could be imposed.152  The judges held that, 
because there was no evidence that the minimum safeguards against such an 
exceptional penalty were available under Rwandan law, they could not order 
referral to Rwandan courts.153  Indeed, this issue was of such fundamental 
concern to the judges that, although Rwanda had passed legislation excluding 
life imprisonment in solitary confinement from cases referred from the 
ICTR, the judges still denied the Prosecutor’s subsequent request to refer 
Hategekimana’s case on the ground that the amendment had not yet entered 
into force at the time of the Appeal Chamber’s Decision.154 
The relevance of this holding to the situation in Uganda is self-evident.  If 
Uganda applies the provisions of the Agreement calling for a “regime of 
alternative penalties and sanctions”155 and proceeds, after trial, to place the 
LRA leaders under sanctions such as house arrest, apologies, or requires 
them merely to pay compensation under a traditional justice process, it is 
unlikely that the domestic trials will meet international standards or, indeed, 
the inadmissibility tests under the Rome Statute.156 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 131, para. 9.   
 152 Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 19–21; Kanyarukiga 
Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 16–17.  The ambiguity arose out of 
whether the punishment regime to be applied to referral cases was the one under a Rwandan 
law providing for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (Transfer Law), or the Rwandan 
law providing for the possibility of life imprisonment with special provisions (i.e., solitary 
confinement) for certain categories of offenders, including those convicted of genocide 
(Abolition of Death Penalty Law).  Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, 
paras. 9–10.  The Appeals Chamber held that there were at least three alternative 
interpretations of the sanctions regime under Rwandan law including that: (1) since the 
Abolition of Death Penalty law post-dated the Transfer Law, it was lex posterior and should 
therefore be applicable; (2) the Transfer Law was lex specialis and its provisions cannot be 
displaced by a general law; and (3) there was in fact no inconsistency between the laws and 
that the Abolition of Death Penalty Law merely elaborated the sentencing structure under the 
Transfer Law.  Id. paras. 16−17.  The Appeals Chamber held that it fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Rwandan courts to determine which of these regimes applied but that the legal 
ambiguity was sufficient to deny the referral request.  Id. paras. 19–21. 
 153 Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 18, 20.  
 154 Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, paras. 37–38. 
 155 Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 6.3. 
 156 Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 126, at 273; see also House of Commons, supra note 
105 (arguing that imprisonment should be the primary penalty for the most serious crimes 
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VII.  PROCEDURAL OPTIONS OPEN TO UGANDA 
The Rome Statute contains several provisions that could be invoked in 
support of domestic trials of the LRA.  First, Uganda can, on the basis of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, request the United Nations Security Council 
to adopt a Chapter VII resolution deferring the ICC investigation or 
prosecution for a renewable period of one year.157  However, as discussed 
below, the Security Council’s “power of ‘negative’ intervention”158 in the 
work of the ICC, while possible on paper, is a difficult one in practice.  First, 
in order to convince the Security Council to grant the deferral, Uganda must 
demonstrate that deferment of the ICC’s work would be in the interests of 
international peace and security under Article 39 of the United Nations 
Charter159 and not just in the interest of domestic peace in the country.  In 
other words, at a prima facie level, the Security Council would have to 
determine that proceeding with the international prosecution would 
constitute a threat to international peace and security before it can order 
deferral. 
Secondly, even if it were possible for one to convincingly argue that the 
request would meet the legal threshold to trigger Security Council deferral, 
Uganda must be able to successfully canvass and convince at least nine of 
the fifteen members of the Security Council including all of the permanent 
five.160  Given the difficult political dynamics and the existing divisions in 
the Security Council regarding the role of the ICC, it is unlikely that Uganda 
would be able to muster sufficient political will on the part of Security 
Council members for them to flex their Article 16 muscle. 
Moreover, if the track record of the Security Council on Article 16 
matters is anything to go by, then it is highly unlikely that Uganda will 
succeed even where it chooses to explore this option.  In 2009, the African 
Union itself, the continental body that represents all of Africa’s fifty-three 
                                                                                                                   
committed during the Ugandan conflict and that the penalty structure under the Rome Statute, 
as well as the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, support the imposition of lengthy terms of 
imprisonment following convictions for serious international crimes including genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
 157 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16. 
 158 DAPO AKANDE ET AL., INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, AN AFRICAN EXPERT STUDY ON THE 
AFRICAN UNION CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE 16 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC 7 (2010). 
 159 U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”).  
 160 Id. art. 27, para. 3.  
2011]        UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY  99 
 
 
member states of the United Nations,161 invited the Security Council to 
invoke Article 16 powers so as to defer the ICC investigation against 
President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan, the sitting Sudanese Head of 
State.162  In making that request, the African Union reasoned that the ICC 
investigation and possible issuance of an arrest warrant against President 
Bashir could derail the Union’s peace initiatives in Darfur.163  Indeed, it was 
the African Union’s position that, while it supported accountability for 
serious crimes committed in Darfur, this process should be properly 
sequenced so that the continent’s efforts to secure a political settlement are 
not undermined.164  Unfortunately, the Security Council did not act on the 
African Union proposal, leading to strained relations not only between the 
Union and Security Council, but also between the Union and the ICC.165  
Relations reached their lowest point when the African Union Assembly of 
Heads of State adopted a Declaration in Sirte, Libya in 2009, calling on its 
members not to cooperate with the ICC investigation on the Bashir 
dossier.166  
Given this experience, it is unlikely that Uganda can succeed on an 
Article 16 request where the whole of the African Union has failed.  While 
deferment of the LRA case by the Security Council remains a theoretical 
possibility, in practice it is fraught with difficulty, including the fact that, 
even if successful, such a deferral would only last for one year at a time, and 
the drafting history of the Rome Statute does not permit the use of Article 16 
as a political weapon to block prosecutions on a permanent basis.167 
                                                                                                                   
 161 AU in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last visited Nov. 
18, 2011). 
 162 Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), para. 8(ii), Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) 
(July 1–3, 2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2009/july/summ 
it/decisions/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%20243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_e.pdf; African 
Union, Communiqué of the 207th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, para. 5, Doc. 
PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/ 
index/Communiqu%20on%20Darfur%20_eng..pdf. 
 163 AKANDE ET AL., supra note 158, at 10–11.  
 164 Id. at 11 (“The [African Union was] concern[ed] that regional efforts for long-term peace 
on the continent should not be undermined by the ICC’s interest in short-term 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
 165 Id. at 5. 
 166 Assembly of the African Union, supra note 162, para. 10. 
 167 Uganda: Any Alternative to the ICC Should Meet Key Benchmarks, supra note 140 
(arguing that in the absence of credible national prosecutions, the Article 16 deferral could, 
where renewed, be utilized to shield the LRA leadership from facing trial and set a dangerous 
precedent of political interference in the ICC’s judicial work). 
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The second alternative open to Uganda would be to raise an admissibility 
challenge before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.  As it currently stands, the 
admissibility of the LRA case can be discussed on the basis of two 
provisions of Article 17 of the Rome Statute that are directly relevant.  First, 
Article 17(1)(a) raises the possibility of an ex ante admissibility challenge, 
i.e., during the course of domestic investigations or prosecutions.168  An ex 
ante admissibility challenge would invoke the complementarity principle on 
the front end and, thereby, forestall the ICC from carrying out any 
investigative or prosecutorial work because the primary jurisdiction state is 
doing so.  This option is no longer available to Uganda in view of its self-
referral.  Indeed, Uganda itself has submitted before the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber that, in view of its inability to arrest Kony and his colleagues, the 
country has not conducted domestic proceedings in the case.169  However, 
Uganda has prevaricated on the issue with senior government officials, 
including President Museveni, suggesting that if the LRA were to sign the 
final peace deal, Uganda would ask the ICC to withdraw the arrest 
warrants.170 
The second variant of the admissibility challenge contained in Article 17 
takes place ex post, i.e., after the completion of domestic proceedings.  This 
variant, which invokes the ne bis in idem principle, is to the effect that 
national proceedings have already taken place and, therefore, that it would be 
unfair to try the accused a second time for the same conduct.171  In order for 
Uganda to successfully invoke this variant of the admissibility challenge, and 
if the ICC were to grant such a challenge, Uganda must show that national 
trials of the LRA were credible, fair, not intended to shield particular 
individuals from responsibility, and conducted in accordance with 
international standards. 
In addition to the procedural options available to Uganda, the ICC 
Prosecutor also has the power under Article 53 of the Rome Statute to 
                                                                                                                   
 168 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 1(a); Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra 
note 30, paras. 35–43. 
 169 Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 37. 
 170 Uganda: Interview with President Yoweri Museveni, supra note 25.  Contrast this 
position with the submissions of Uganda’s Solicitor-General before the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber that “ ‘the Government of Uganda ha[d] not conducted and d[id] not intend to 
conduct national proceedings in relation to the persons most responsible for these crimes, so 
that the cases may be dealt with by the ICC instead.’ ”  Kony Decision on Admissibility, 
supra note 30, para. 37 (citation omitted).  
 171 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 17, para. 1(c), 20, para. 3.  Kony Decision on 
Admissibility, supra note 30, paras. 35–43. 
2011]        UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY  101 
 
 
discontinue or reconsider ongoing investigations or prosecutions.172  The 
Rome Statute confers discretion on the Prosecutor to determine, upon review 
of information made available to him, that he lacks a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution.173  Such a conclusion could be 
based on the Prosecutor’s determination, following a review of “the gravity 
of the crime and the interests of the victims” that ICC prosecution would not 
be in “the interests of justice.”174  Therefore, the Rome Statute itself provides 
for a consequentialist analysis of international prosecution.  Arguably, the 
need to secure a peaceful settlement and an end to human suffering that 
comes with violent conflict or war, provides sufficient reason to invoke the 
Prosecutor’s Article 53 powers. 
However, the ICC Prosecutor has argued “that there is a difference 
between . . . the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the 
latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of the 
Prosecutor.”175  The paper also makes clear that the Prosecutor’s exercise of 
the discretion conferred by Article 53 is of a limited and exceptional nature, 
which will be guided by the presumption in favor of prosecution, as well as 
“by the objects and purpose of the Statute” in fighting impunity for serious 
international crimes.176 
As regards the Prosecutor’s power to reconsider the decision to 
investigate or prosecute on the basis of new facts or information, it can be 
argued that a successful domestic trial of the LRA could provide such new 
facts or information and, thus, justify a decision to drop the warrants against 
the LRA.  Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the ICC Prosecutor 
would want to leave this option available, observe the domestic proceedings 
in Uganda when they take place, and then decide at a later date whether to 
apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber to drop the arrest warrants.  It is further 
suggested that this approach could be a useful tool to maintain pressure on 
the Ugandan government to ensure a credible accountability process for the 
LRA leadership. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Uganda situation is complex and multi-faceted.  A long, drawn-out, 
violent, internal conflict has eluded peaceful resolution despite various 
                                                                                                                   
 172 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53, paras. 1–2, 4.  
 173 Id. para. 2. 
 174 Id. para. 1(c). 
 175 POLICY PAPER, supra note 103, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 176 Id. 
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domestic and international initiatives.  There is no question that those 
responsible for committing serious international crimes in the course of this 
conflict must be brought to justice.  It is interesting that the international 
accountability process set in motion in 2003 through Uganda’s self-referral 
appears to have produced a welcome, albeit unforeseen, willingness of the 
LRA to negotiate peace.  This apparent willingness by the LRA to negotiate 
peace has led to an agreement that they will face domestic accountability 
instead of trial at the ICC.  However, the LRA’s failure to sign on to the final 
peace deal has raised questions about their real motives and commitment to 
peace.  Given the rebel group’s failure to end hostilities and submit to 
domestic accountability, it appears as though they are merely buying time to 
continue to wreak havoc on the civilian population in Northern Uganda and 
beyond.  The LRA’s stance has, therefore, left the provisions on domestic 
accountability contained in the Agreement and Annexure hanging in the 
balance.  In addition, the failure of Uganda and its neighbors, such as Sudan 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to arrest Kony or otherwise convince 
him to surrender for trial has left the ICC warrants in the air without 
indication if and when they can be meaningfully enforced. 
Despite the current situation, it would be unwise to insist upon Hague-
based trials of the LRA at all costs.  Given the domestic peace imperative, 
the large domestic constituency that continues to advocate for accountability 
options other than the ICC, the fact that most of the evidence and victims are 
located in Uganda, and the comforting fact that Uganda has a functioning 
legal and judicial system in place, Uganda-based trials offer the best prospect 
of securing both peace and justice in the LRA case.  Yet, it must be 
emphasized that now is not the time to drop the ICC arrest warrants.  As long 
as the LRA continues to hold out in the jungles of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, the ICC warrants must be kept in place as an incentive for them to 
fully commit to a peace process and benefit from domestic accountability.  
Similarly, even assuming that the LRA leaders surrender at some point in the 
near future, the warrants must be kept in place during the pendency of any 
ensuing national trials so as to encourage the Government of Uganda to 
ensure fair and credible trials that meet international legal standards.  
Presumably, credible and genuine domestic trials of the LRA leaders would 
contribute to the realization of the international community’s objective of 
fighting impunity and promoting accountability for serious violations of 
international law, while at the same time providing a basis for sustainable 
peace and reconciliation in Uganda. 
As matters stand, there are no winners in the Ugandan situation.  The 
justice processes in both Uganda and the ICC are hamstrung by their failure 
to arrest Kony and his commanders.  The continuing ability of the rebel 
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leadership to evade justice does not serve the call of Uganda’s government 
and people for a peaceful end to the war.  Due to the conflict, victims 
continue to suffer from an environment of terror and deprivation; the ICC’s 
credibility hangs in the balance because of the perception that the arrest 
warrants constitute an impediment to a final peace settlement; and the 
international community’s objective of fighting impunity and ensuring 
accountability for the grave crimes committed in Uganda stays in perpetual 
abeyance.  
Given these circumstances, perhaps the ICC would do well to content 
itself with the fact that the existence of the arrest warrants has produced a 
shift in the bargaining positions of the rebel leadership and, presumably, a 
better disposition on the rebels’ part to end the war and face accountability in 
domestic courts.  This can only be a sign of the relative effectiveness of the 
ICC regime.  After all, positive complementarity must account for the effect 
of the Rome Statute in spurring genuine and effective domestic prosecutions 
for grave violations of international law.  That complementarity would lead 
to such an outcome was the dream and desire, in other words, the intent of 
the founders of the Rome Statute.  It would be consistent with that intent to 
pay heed to the delicate political and legal landscape in Uganda by 
supporting the domestic accountability process—at least for the time being. 
